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1 Introduction
One of the most documented empirical regularities in the fiscal federalism
literature is the so-called flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar
and Shah, 2007). This effect refers to the observed greater stimulatory effect
of unconditional grants on local government spending than increases of the
community income.
However in the traditional grants-in-aid theoretical framework, these
findings are puzzling (Oates, 1999). The standard approach, formalized by
Bradford and Oates (1971), predicts that grants to local governments are
equivalent to increments of community income. The reasons is that money
is fungible and thus a local government should have the same propensity to
spend out of individual income or lump-sum grants1. This result is know as
the veil hypothesis because it suggests that intergovernmental transfers are
simply a veil for central government’s tax rebates (Oates, 1999).
Given the evident conflict between theory predictions and empirical ob-
servations, the flypaper effect has been treated as an anomaly inconsistent
with economic theory (Hines and Thaler, 1995). Not surprisingly, until now
documenting and understanding this apparently paradox has dominated the
debate on the impact of intergovernmental transfers in academic and pro-
fessional’s circles (Rosen, 2005; Shah, 2007; Smart, 2007).
Most explanation focus on identifying flaws in the empirical strategy such
as functional miss-specification (Becker, 1996), omitted variables (Hamilton,
1983), reverse causality (Knight, 2002) or mistakes in classifying conditional
transfers as lump sum grants (Moffitt, 1984). Overall, this literature casts
doubts on the existence of the flypaper effect and suggests empirical studies
may be overestimating it2.
On the other hand, there is also a literature that try to fix the stan-
dard model to account for the flypaper effect. Most explanations do so by
creating a divergence between the local government policies and the median
voter preferences. The sources of political bias include imperfect information
(Courant et al., 1979; Oates, 1979), uncertainty (Turnbull, 1998) or the ac-
1A similar argument is found in the aid literature. In this case, we could expect that a
recipients’ spending do not increase as a response of external aid. See Van de Walle and
Mu (2007) for a recent survey of the literature.
2For a detailed survey of the literature see Hines and Thaler (1995), Bailey and Con-
nolly (1998) or Gamkhar and Shah (2007).
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tion of agenda setting budget-maximizing bureaucrats (Filimon et al., 1982).
However, these explanations provide only a partial account and fail to pre-
dict a flypaper effect with the magnitude observed empirically (Hines and
Thaler, 1995; Bailey and Connolly, 1998).
More recently, Roemer and Silvestre (2002) depart from the median voter
approach and develop a model of party competition in a multidimensional
policy space. They are unable to determine, in general, the sign or magni-
tude of the flypaper effect. However numerical calibrations of the computed
equilibria yield values similar to the observed flypaper effect.
In this paper I argue that there is nothing anomalous about the flypaper
effect. I develop a simple median voter model of local government spending
with costly tax collection and show that in general it predicts the flypaper
effect. In contrast to previous explanations, this model does not require
any political bias nor multidimensional policy spaces to generate different
propensities to spend out of income and grants.
More importantly, the model provides a simple and quantifiable mea-
sure of the flypaper effect as a function of the tax rate and tax collection
costs. This result has not been obtained before and it is important since the
flypaper paradox is mainly an empirical issue.
Using this insight, I evaluate numerically how well the model explain
the observed flypaper effect in U.S. sub-national governments. Previous esti-
mates of the effect of US federal grants suggest that the marginal propensity
to spend out of grants is in average 0.64 while the propensity to spend out
of local income is between 0.05-0.10. In order to explain this difference the
model requires a tax rate between 8% to 16%. This is a very plausible figure
considering that estimates of the state-local tax rate in U.S. are between
10-11% (Dubay, 2007a).
In order to motivate costly tax collection I focus on compliance and
administrative costs. These costs are not negligible and in some cases may
be as important as the distortionary costs of taxation (Slemrod, 1990). For
example, estimates of the compliance and administrative costs of operating
the income tax system in the U.S. range from 5% to 10% of total revenue
(Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992; Slemrod and
Yitzhaki, 2002). At local level, Wicks and Killwort (1967) estimate the cost
of collecting property taxes as 9.5% of the total tax collection.
This paper relates to the work of Hamilton (1986). He develops a median
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voter model with distortionary taxation. Similar to this paper, his model
predicts greater responsiveness of local spending to lump-sum grants than to
community income. However, he is unable to predict the magnitude of the
difference and thus to evaluate how well the model account for the flypaper
effect.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model
and shows the results with and without costly tax collection. Section 3
applies the model insights to explain the observed flypaper effect in U.S.
sub-national governments. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a community populated by a continuum of citizens of mass one
with heterogenous income yi. In order to abstract from the effect of income
inequality, I restrict attention to symmetric distributions such that both the
average and median income are equal.
There a two tiers of government: a central and a local government. Both
provide public goods, collect taxes and their representatives are elected in
general elections. In addition, the central government provides financial
support as lump-sum grants to the local government. For the model, I
focus on the policy decisions of the local government and take the central
government’s policies as given.
Citizens derive utility from private consumption ci and a homogenous
public good g provided by the local government. Preferences are defined by
a quasilinear utility function
Vi = ci +H(g) (1)
where the utility from the public good H(g) is an increasing and concave
function.
The local government funds the provision of the public good from two
revenues sources: a local income tax and a grant from the central govern-
ment. The local income tax is proportional and cannot be targeted to any
particular group so there is a common tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1). The local gov-
ernment sets the tax rate and collects the tax revenues. In contrast, the
decisions on grant’s funding and allocation are made by the central govern-
ment.
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Tax collection is costly due to compliance and administrative costs3.
Compliance costs refers to the value of the time spent by the taxpayer fill-
ing tax returns as well as any expenditure on goods and services for the
same purpose. Administrative costs refers to the resources used by the tax
authority to operate the tax system. It includes, among others, the cost of
processing tax returns, monitoring tax evasion and the required legal pro-
ceeds. The most relevant difference between both costs is that compliance
costs are borne by the taxpayers while administrative costs are borne by the
tax authority (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).
These costs are not negligible but in some cases4 are as relevant as the
distortionary costs of taxation (Slemrod, 1990, p. 169). For example, in
the U.S. the compliance and administrative costs of the federal and state
income tax may account for 5-10% of total tax revenue (Slemrod and Sorum,
1984; Slemrod, 1996). In the case of local governments, Wicks and Killwort
(1967) find that administrative and compliance costs of real property taxes
represent 9.5% of tax revenue.
I model tax compliance and administrative costs as proportional to the
tax base and increasing on the tax rate5. In particular, for citizen i the
compliance cost is a fraction Cc(τ) of her income while for the tax author-
ity the administrative cost represents a proportion Ca(τ) of the tax base6.
Both Cc(τ) and Ca(τ) are increasing and convex functions and adopt values
strictly between 0 and τ7.
Given the previous assumptions, we can write the indirect utility of
citizen i as
Vi = yi [1− τ − Cc(τ)] +H(g) (2)
3Since the local government cannot affect the size of grants, whether they are or not
costly does not affect the tax rate nor the level of expenditure.
4For an empirical survey of compliance and administrative costs see Sandford (1995).
5A rationale for this specification is that higher tax rates may increase the benefits of
tax evasion or elusion. In this case, taxpayer would spent more time and effort trying
to reduce their tax bills while the administration would require more monitoring and tax
enforcement actions to increase tax revenues. In terms of the model this implies a more
costly tax collection.
6Modeling collection costs as a proportion of the tax base facilitates comparison of the
model results with empirical estimates. In most cases these estimates are calculated as a
proportion of the tax revenue.
7This condition avoids a corner solution with zero taxation.
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while the local government’s budget constraint is
g = y [τ − Ca(τ)] + a (3)
where y is the average income and a is the lump-sum grant per capita re-
ceived from the central government. Note that compliance costs reduce
citizen’s consumption while administrative costs reduce the resources avail-
able for government spending. Moreover, expression y [τ − Ca(τ)] represents
the net tax revenue after deducting administrative costs
Assumption 1: C ′a < 1 This assumption guarantees that the net tax
revenue is an increasing and monotonic function of the tax rate.
The political process to define the local tax rate and public spending is
one of Downsian electoral competition. There are two office-seeking politi-
cians running for local office, electoral promises are enforceable and the
winning candidate is defined by simple majority rule. The timing of events
is as follows. Firstly, candidates simultaneously announce their policies τ
and g. Secondly, local elections are held. Finally, the appointed politician
implements her announced policy platform.
This setup is relatively standard in the political economy literature and
has been widely used by Persson and Tabellini (2000) in their analysis of
public spending and redistributive politics. The only differences are the
introduction of grants a as an additional source of revenue and costly tax
collection.
Equilibrium policy Rearranging the budget constraint (3), we can ex-
press τ as a function of g:
F (τ) ≡ τ − Ca(τ) = g − a
y
(4)
where F ′ > 0, F ′′ > 0 by assumption 1 and convexity of Ca(τ). Since F is
a monotonic function, we can write the tax rate as
τ = f
(
g − a
y
)
(5)
where f (·) = F−1 (·).
The citizen’s utility (2) satisfies single-crossing property and allow us
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to apply the median voter theorem8. Thus, in equilibrium the government
spending is
g∗ = arg max y [1− τ − Cc(τ)] +H(g) (6)
Solving (6) we obtain the equilibrium policy:
g∗ = h
((
1 + C ′c
)
f ′
)
(7)
where h (·) is the inverse function of H ′ (·) .
2.1 Costless tax collection
Let us first study as a benchmark the case of costless tax collection. In this
scenario, expression (7) simplifies to g∗ = h (1) and it is easy to note that
the effect of intergovernmental transfers and local income on g∗ are both
identical and equal to zero9.
When tax collection is costless, the model predicts that grants from the
central government do not affect spending but instead are fully translated
to citizens as tax rebates. Moreover, the mechanism to transfer resources
becomes irrelevant because both grants and local income are equivalent in
terms of their effect on local government spending and taxation.
This result replicates the veil hypothesis which has provided the theo-
retical basis for the flypaper paradox (Oates, 1999, p. 1129). According
to this hypothesis, when the local authority is representative of the me-
dian voter and taxation is costless, both intergovernmental grants and local
income have similar effect on local spending. In this approach, the local
government acts only as a veil and does not distort the final allocation of
resources.
2.2 Costly tax collection
Let us now relax the assumption of costless taxation. We can calculate the
marginal propensities to spend from expression (7) to obtain:
8To see this note that ∂2V
∂g∂yi
= g−a
y2
[(1 + C′c) f
′′ + C′′c f
′f ′] > 0
9This result is extreme due to the quasi-linearity assumption which eliminates the
income effect.
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dg∗
dy
= −h
′
y
[(
1 + C ′c
)
f ′′ + C ′′c f
′f ′
] g∗ − a
y
(8)
dg∗
da
= −h
′
y
[(
1 + C ′c
)
f ′′ + C ′′c f
′f ′
]
(9)
These propensities to spend are positive since h′ < 0, f ′′ > 0 and C ′′c > 0.
Thus, in contrast to the benchmark case, the model predicts a positive
relation between local spending and both community income and lump-sum
grants. The reason is that grants reduce the tax rate required to fund a
given level of spending. In turn, this lowers tax collection costs and reduces
the marginal cost of public spending.
Expressions (8) and (9) provide a way to link both marginal propensities
to spend and evaluate the magnitude of the flypaper effect. Using both
results and definition (4) we obtain the following relation10:
dg∗
dy
=
dg∗
da
[τ∗ − Ca(τ∗)] (10)
where τ∗ is the equilibrium tax rate and Ca(τ∗) is the administrative
cost as a proportion of the tax base.
Note that τ∗−Ca(τ∗) < 1 since Ca(τ∗) ∈ (0, τ∗) and τ∗ < 1. This result
implies that the marginal propensity to spend out of central government’s
grants is greater than the marginal propensity to spend out of community
income11. This prediction is consistent with the observed flypaper effect and,
contrary to the veil hypothesis, suggests that local income and lump-sum
grants are not equivalent.
This non-equivalence result is due to the different costs of public funds
faced by the local government. In particular, from the point of view of the
local government collecting taxes is more costly than using grants. However,
this cost difference arises because the local government does not to inter-
nalize the cost of funding the transfer scheme12. Thus, this result points
out a potential source of inefficiency in fiscal decentralization processes with
10The result in expression (10) does not require the inclusion of both administrative
and compliance costs. When we consider only administrative costs the result is identical.
When, we include only compliance costs the expression simplifies to dg
∗
dy
= dg
∗
da
τ∗.
11Moreover, finding similar marginal propensities would be rare since it requires very
high tax rates and negligible compliance costs.
12In the model the failure occurs because the central and local governments’ policies are
chosen in separated political processes.
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overspending at local level.
In contrast to previous explanations, this model provides a quantifiable
measure of the flypaper effect. Recall that the flypaper effect is the observed
difference between the marginal propensities to spend out of income and
grants. In the model this difference can be measured by the ratio of both
marginal propensities to spend τ∗−Ca(τ∗). In most application this ratio is
quantifiable since both the tax rate and administrative costs are observable.
Moreover, it can be used to compare the model predictions to estimates of
the flypaper effect13.
This model relates to Hamilton (1986). He develops a median voter
model with distortionary taxation to explain the flypaper effect. Similar to
my model, Hamilton finds that a local government spend more when receiv-
ing grants than when the local income increases. However, he is unable to
predict the magnitude of the flypaper effect and hence to contrast the model
predictions with empirical estimates. The main difference is that Hamilton
uses a general utility function while I assume a quasilinear specification14.
3 Explaining the flypaper effect in U.S. subna-
tional governments
This section evaluates whether the observed flypaper effect in U.S. sub-
national governments could be predicted by the model using previous esti-
mates of propensities to spend and tax rate. This exercise does not attempt
to be a formal empirical proof of the model but instead a back of the envelope
calculation to check whether it can provide a plausible explanation.
I focus on estimates of the flypaper effect from studies surveyed by Hines
and Thaler (1995). The studies in the sample are some of the most com-
monly cited in the flypaper literature and use data from U.S. state and local
governments.
Table 1 presents the estimates of dg
∗
da from each study. In average, the
estimated effect of grants is around 0.64. In contrast, suggested estimates
of dg
∗
dy are much smaller ranging from 0.05 to 0.10 (Hines and Thaler, 1995,
p. 218). This difference cannot be reconciled in the standard grants-in-aid
13In the next section I use this insight to evaluate numerically how well the model
accounts for the observed flypaper effect in the case of U.S. sub-national governments.
14As previously mentioned, this assumption is commonly used in political economy
models of public spending and redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2000)
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theory and illustrates the flypaper paradox. The last two columns show the
ratio of both propensities to spend calculated for different values of dg
∗
dy . This
ratio corresponds to the empirical magnitude of the flypaper effect and, for
the average case, ranges between 8-16%.
Estimates of administrative costs of state and local governments in U.S.
are between 0.5%-1.5% of the tax collections15. In terms of the tax base,
this cost is very small and we can safely omit it from the calculation. In this
case, the model predicts that the magnitude of the flypaper effect is equal
to the tax rate τ .
As a proxy for the tax rate, I use the state-local tax burden. The state-
local tax burden is calculated dividing the national per capita state-local
taxes by the national per capita income (Dubay, 2007b). Previous estimates
suggest that since mid 1980s the state-local burden in U.S. has been between
10-11% (Dubay, 2007a).
Note that the predicted flypaper effect lies within the range of the esti-
mated one. The similarity is higher when the effect of grants is relatively
large, situation in which the flypaper effect is stronger. While not con-
clusive, this evidence suggest that the proposed model may be a plausible
explanation of the flypaper effect.
15See Mikesell (1998, p. 175) for a brief survey of administrative costs in U.S.
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4 Conclusion
This paper presents an alternative explanation for the flypaper effect. I
extend a standard median voter of public spending with costly tax collections
and intergovernmental transfers. The model does not need to introduce
imperfect information or any political bias to generate predictions consistent
with the empirical regularities.
Using the analytical framework, I replicate the veil hypothesis result as
a particular case with costless taxation. By relaxing this assumption, which
may be to stringent in this application, the comparative statics become
consistent with the observed flypaper effect.
The model has the additional advantage to provide a measure of the
difference between marginal propensities to spent out of grants and out of
local income. This insight not only provides a simple way to evaluate the
validity of the model but also suggests that not observing a flypaper effect
would be puzzling, because it would imply very high effective tax rates.
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